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vAbstract
In the last few years, cloud computing has grown from being a promising
business concept to one of the fastest growing segments of the IT industry.
Big companies like Amazon, Google, Microsoft etc., expand their market by
adopting Cloud Computing systems which enhance their services provided
to a large number of users. However, security and privacy issues present a
strong barrier for users to adapt into the Cloud.This research investigates
the security features and issues of cloud platforms using OpenStack as a
case study. The goal was to identify security weakness in terms of
Authentication and Identity Management(IAM), and Data Management. Base
on the findings, specific recommendations on security standards and
management models have been proffered in order to address these problems.
These Recommendations if implemented, will lead to trust in cloud
computing systems, which in turn would encourage more companies to
adopt cloud computing, as a means of providing better IT services.
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CHAPTER ONE
1.1 Introduction
The term Cloud computing refers to the delivery of computing as a service rather
than a product. I.e providing resources, software, and information to computers
and other devices as service over a network (typically the Internet) as shown in
figure 1 below. Cloud computing provides services without requiring users to know
the location and details of its operation[1]. Furthermore, it is a design concept
which tries to separate the application from the operating system on which the
hardware runs.
Fig: 1.1 Cloud Computing logical Diagram [2]
Due to its high scalable nature, it can provide infinite computing resources on
demand, which remove lots of burden on cloud service providers when it comes to
hardware provisioning. Since an up-front commitment can be eliminated, smaller
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cloud providers are able to provide services to companies and can also increase
their hardware resources only when there is high demand. During usage of cloud
services, users are charged based on short-term basis. For instance a user can be
charged for storage service on a daily base. Because of the scalability of Cloud in
providing services, users can benefit from different services (e.g. Data as a Service
(DaaS), Software as a Service (SaaS) or Platform as a Service (PaaS). Therefore, one
can say that Cloud Computing has evolved at an incredible pace.
In the last few years, cloud computing has grown from being a promising business
concept to one of the fastest growing segments of the Information Technology (IT)
industry. Big companies like Amazon, Google, Windows Azure, and OpenStack has
expanded their market by adopting Cloud Computing which has enabled them to
provide for large number of users.
However, security and privacy issues present a strong barrier for users to adapt to
this new form of IT. According to an International Data Cooperation (IDC) survey in
August 2008, security was regarded as the top challenge in cloud computing [3].
Security is one of the top concerns, says users of cloud computing who fear that
their business information and critical IT resources in the Cloud are vulnerable to
attacks. Furthermore, cloud computing became a hot topic at the RSA security
conference in San Francisco in April 2009, where Cisco CEO Chambers said that
Cloud computing was inevitable, but that it would shake up the way that networks
are secured[4].
Most cloud security problems arise because of lack of control, lack of trust
mechanisms, multitenancy etc. These problems exist mainly in third party
management models and also self-managed cloud platforms. Security is very
difficult to implement in cloud computing because of the different forms of attacks
in both the application side and in the hardware components. In fact, some attacks
with catastrophic effects only need one security flaw.
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When it comes to privacy, its concept varies widely among countries, cultures, and
jurisdictions. Privacy rights or obligations are related to the collection, use,
disclosure, storage, and destruction of personal data. But in the end the general
idea about privacy lies in how organizations account for user's data, as well as the
transparency to an organization’s practice around personal information.
In this research, an investigation has been made on the security features of cloud
platforms using OpenStack as a case study. The goal of this thesis was to identify
security weakness related to Authentication and Identity Management (IAM), and
Data Management. Base on the findings, different recommendations have been
provided on how to address these problems. These Recommendations if
implemented, will lead to trust in cloud computing systems which in turn would
encourage companies to adopt cloud computing.
1.2 Prior Research on the Topic
The evolution of this new form of computing has become a very popular research
area, because it poses some risk in its operation. One important risk factor is that
of Security and privacy. And this needs to be corrected as early as possible. The
following enhances the variety of researches conducted in the area which have
been considered in this thesis.
Since 2009, there has been a number of articles and papers on cloud computing
with high focused on its security implementations. Cloud computing is a very
complex system which needs to be understood properly. The NIST defines Cloud
Computing as:
“A model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of
configured computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and
services as shown in fig1.1) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with
minimal management effort or service provider interaction. This cloud model
promotes availability and is composed of five essential-characteristics, three
- 4 -
service models, and four deployment models.” [5].
Base on the above definition, since the aim of cloud computing is sharing of
computing resources (networks, servers, storage, application, and services), this
raises lot of concerns for the security and privacy risks involved in such computing.
In a final report on the topic “Understanding the Security, Privacy and Trust
Challenges” [6], the Security, Privacy and Trust challenges in cloud computing
have been identified accordingly. Other research papers have also highlighted
these problems in the areas of Authentication and Identity Management, Access
Control, Trust Management and Policy Integration, Secure-Service Management,
Privacy and Data Protection [7]. With respect to this research area, special interest
have been placed on Authentication and Identity management, and that of Privacy
and Data protection. In a Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Computer Science
Department of Middlebury College by Bevan Barton, the issue of Cloud
Infrastructure Vulnerabilities which presents security issues at the network, host,
and application levels was also mentioned [8]. His thesis points out the difficulty of
applying encryption methods in the cloud. Of course this is another important
factor to look at, since most cloud platforms are yet to provide better encryption
facilities for user data.
In a specialization project report presented to the University of Agder, analyzes and
comparison of security features and solution provided by different cloud platforms;
OpenStack, Amazon and Windows Azure, was presented. Based on the theoretical
findings in that research, It was realized that out of the three, OpenStack has more
weaknesses than the remaining two especially in the aspect of data protection[21].
This observation presented more reasons to make an in-depth security scrutiny on
OpenStack Platform. Also, in Primož Cigoj’s masters seminar [9], security issues in
OpenStack where analyzed. His argument was that there are some underlying
security issues in the cloud and he pointed this out using OpenStack as case study
in his work.
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Over the years, solutions to these problems have been suggested at conferences
and also written in research papers and documents. The notion of public
auditability has recently been proposed in order to ensure that the integrity of
remotely stored data under different security models is maintained [10], [11], [12],
[13]. This will allow external party, in addition to the user himself, to verify the
correctness of remotely stored data. However, most of these schemes [10], [11], [12],
do not support the privacy protection of users’ data against external auditors, i.e.,
they may potentially reveal users' information to the auditors, as it will be
discussed in this paper. This severe drawback greatly affects the security of these
protocols in Cloud Computing. In as much as providing auditing mechanisms is
good, it is also important that vulnerabilities leading to unauthorized information
leakage is not introduced into cloud systems[14].
However, there are legal regulations, such as the US Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [15], which demands that outsourced data must
not to be leaked to external parties. Applying data encryption before outsourcing
data is one way to mitigate privacy problems [13].
1.3 Overview of OpenStack
OpenStack is an open source software which anyone can use to build both private
and public cloud[16]. The aim of OpenStack is "to produce the ubiquitous open
source cloud computing platform that will meet the needs of public and private
clouds regardless of size, by being simple to implement and massively
scalable"[17].
The Platform was founded by Rackspace and that of NASA. It all started when
NASA was trying to build a private cloud on top of Eucalyptus, but encountered a
problem since Eucalyptus could not be scaled and open as NASA hoped it should
be [19 ][18 ]. As a result, NASA decided to build a cloud controller from scratch and
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started a project call “NOVA” [19]. While NASA was making its project to be open
sourced, Rackspace was about to do the same with both its compute engine and
Storage controller. This made the two to collaborate and ended up creating an open
source cloud software [18]. OpenStack was first launched in July 2010. Later in
October of the same year, the first project(Austin) was released and made available
to the public [20]. The platform has made several releases since then. The following
are the different releases and dates of availability [20]:
I. Austin—21st October 2010. II. Bexar—03rd February 2011
III. Cactus—15th April 2011 IV. Diablo—22nd September 2011
V. Essex—5th April 2012 VI. Folsom—27th September 2012
VII. Grizzly—4th April 2012
1.4 OpenStack Projects
I) OpenStack Compute: It is also known for its code name as “Nova”. It’s from
NASA’s compute files and it provides and manages large networks, users and
projects [21]. The aim of Nova is to be hardware and hypervisor agnostic. Currently,
it supports different virtualization technologies such as; Citrix XenServer, UML,
Microsoft Hyper-V, Xen, KVM, QEMU, VMWare and LXC Containers [ 22].
II) OpenStack Object Storage: This component is also known for its code name
“Swift”. It’s also from Rackspace’s “Cloud Files” and provides storage system for
large amounts of static data by the use of clusters of standardized servers [21]. It
provides a ReSTful API for uploading and downloading files into the cluster. It
support Language-specific libraries such as Java, C#, PHP, Python and Ruby.
III) OpenStack Image Repository: Another name for this project is Glance. It
provides REST interface for querying information about virtual disk images. With
glance, clients can register and retrieve new virtual disk images from the
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system[21]. The Image registry allows multiple formats, including the following:
Raw, VHD (Hyper-V), VDI (VirtualBox), qcow2 (Qemu/KVM), VMDK (VMWare),
OVF (VMWare, others) [23].
The diagram below (figure1.2) shows how the three major components are
connected.
Fig 1.2 The relationship between the thee components [9]
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CHAPTER TWO
2.1 Motivations
Though cloud computing is growing very fast, there are still security barriers that
discourage more users from adopting this system. For two consecutive years,
security was listed as the most important concern of cloud computing according to
the survey conducted by International Data Corporation (IDC) [24], [25]. There was
also a warning issued by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
that "security challenges [that] cloud computing presents are formidable", [26].
Researchers from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) also stated that
securing cloud computing is the "information technology’s next grand challenge"
[27]. These concerns on security issues in cloud computing serves as the primary
motivation behind this research.
When considering whether to adopt cloud usage or not, the first question most
potential customers ask is ‘How secure will our data be in the hands of the service
provider?”. Customers have right to ask such question and also to closely examine
a vendor’s security credentials before making any decision. Any incident pertaining
to privacy or security - even a minor one is capable of eroding brand equity and
consumer trust.
Furthermore, the privacy and security capabilities possessed by different cloud
platforms will affect their acceptance and how innovative applications are
developed. For instance, users who critically needs privacy may favor service
providers who honestly and seriously undertake to deliver specific levels of security
and privacy as part of a bundle of services. Hence it is very important to have more
research on the security issues that affects the adoption of cloud computing.
2.2 Objectives and Limitations
The main objective of this research is to analyze how various security issues
relevant to cloud computing are been handled in cloud platforms with reference to
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OpenStack. It should be noted that what has been considered here for this
research is only the Object Storage component, since OpenStack consists of many
different projects. The security issues related to other OpenStack projects were not
considered in this thesis. Also when analyzing the security issues of OpenStack,
two major security areas was investigated; Identity and Access Management, and
Data Management.
In identifying cloud computing security issues in general, different cloud
computing security-related documents created by individual researchers and
organization have been analyzed and compared, with the findings presented
accordingly. Only the areas of Identity and Access Management, Access Control,
and that of Privacy and Data protection was studied.
2.3 Methodology
The approach towards this research involves two phases;
i) Theoretical research on security issues of cloud computing
ii)Experimental investigation on the security issues/weaknesses of OpenStack.
i) Theoretical Research on Security Issues of Cloud Computing and its
Platforms
This part of the research investigates the security issues of cloud computing in
general. By studying different documents which aim at helping companies and
organizations to provide better cloud security solutions for their customers, the
issues in certain security features like Authentication and Identity Management,
Access Control, and that of Privacy and Data Protection was analyzed. These
analysis have been presented in the third chapter.
ii) Experimental Investigation on Security Issues/Weaknesses of
OpenStack.
In this phase, the first approach was to Installed the open source software (Open-
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Stack) using the configuration files in appendix B. Next, an investigation was then
carried in order to obtain the issues related to the Identity and Authentication
Method, and that of Privacy and Data Protection in OpenStack Object Storage.
2.4 Deployment of OpenStack
In the experimental setup, only the OpenStack Object Storage was used in order to
identify the security issues related to this platform. The software and devices used
in performing the experiment were:
i. Host Computer with 8GB RAM, at least 30GB free disk space, internet
connection, VT-X enabled in BIOS. The host Operating System being windows(can
also be Linux or Mac which can support VirtualBox).
ii. VirtualBox 4 : 4.1.12-dfsg-2 (from “universe”).
iii. Ubuntu 12.04 LTS Precise Pangolin ISO image
The First step in the experimental setup was to install virtual box and then
configuring it. This gave a complete multi-node cluster which can be accessed and
managed from the computer running VirtualBox. Figure 2.1 below shows an
illustration of the deployment of VirtualBox on a Host PC.
Fig 2.1: VirtualBox installed on a host PC [ 28]
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The next step was to create different virtual machines, configuring and powering
them. All of this is performed in the virtualBox which was created initially. This is
shown in figure 2.2. These VMs further require the installation of ubuntu as their
operating system [29].
Fig 2.2: Virtual machine creation
Afterwards, with the creation and configuration of the Virtual Machines, the
OpenStack Object Storage software also known as swift, was then installed on
windows host machine with the help of the virtualBox [29]. In the deployment of
OpenStack Swift, the procedure described in "OpenStack Cloud Computing Cook
Book" [30] ws followed. In order to achieve better efficiency, only three zones were
created. Also, three storage nodes were then made within these zones and
connected to the windows host machine through the virtual box as shown in figure
2.3 bellow.
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Figure 2.3: OpenStack Object Storage Installed in a virtualized environment
From figure 2.3, the first step in operation is to connect the host machine directly
to the internet. The VirtualBox should also be connected to the internet but
virtually (using virtual IP addressing method). In the next step of operation, the
host machine(User) makes request through the VirtualBox and this request is then
forwarded to the OpenStack Object Storage. The Object Storage will then verify the
user's credentials and if it proves to be correct, the host machine(user) will be
granted access to the the node(s) containing its own data. The host machine or
VirtualBox can only access these data via internet connection as shown in the
figure 2.3.
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For you to be able to connect from the outer world and reach the storage nodes, it
is important to select the right networking mode. Because in a real world situation,
only proxy node should be able to communicate with storage nodes.
This is shown in figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4: VirtualBox Host-Only networking on windows
Finally, In order to observe and make good security analysis of OpenStack, the
network traffic should be intercepted between the proxy machine and that of the
storage nodes (A, B and C). This was done with the help of the VirtualBox
Host-Only Ethernet Adapter. With the use of a Wire-shark Protocol Analyzer,
network packets were captured, observed and analyzed.
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CHAPTER THREE
This chapter outlines security issues in general that are related to both public and
private cloud platforms. Analysis has been made on the areas of Authentication
and Identity Management, Access Control, and that of Privacy and Data Protection.
This chapter also recommends solutions to these problems, as way of improving
cloud operation.
3.1 Security Issues From Public and Private Cloud
Service Providers
In order to succeed in cloud computing, it is very important to understand the
security and privacy risks involved. In as much as the cloud provides so many good
services like avoiding start-up costs, reducing operating costs, and infrastructural
resources when needed, they also raise a lot of security and privacy concerns.
Making data available on demand is quite important, but there comes in the
challenge in ensuring that only authorized persons or certain group are given
rights to access it.
Using cloud becomes even more critical since the usage of data and its decisions
are made by third parties. As at now, it is actually impossible to guarantee that
user's data cannot be misused by the cloud providers themselves, hence the very
reason why both technical and nontechnical solutions should be applied in order
to resolve the problems of the Cloud.
The following sub-sections outline the technological challenges in the cloud and its
associated services.
3.1.1 Authentication and Identity Management
The use of cloud services, makes it possible for users to easily access their personal
information and other useful services across the Internet. But for this to happen,
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users have to provide their credentials through an identity management (IDM)
system [31].
As authentication is done for users, there could be issues of interoperability
involved due to the usage of different identity tokens and identity negotiation
protocols within the system. An IDM system should be made in such a way that it
must be able to protect private and sensitive information. Unfortunately, there are
certainly some limitations and risks associated with the password-based
authentication system which is currently employed. Also, it is very important to
understand how the privacy of identity information can be affected by multi-tenant
cloud operations. Multi-jurisdictional issues are capable of complicating protection
measures [32]. In order words, user's identity and credentials must be protected
whenever these users interact with a front-end service [31], [33]. These challenges
can specifically be seen when using cloud as SaaS, PaaS and IaaS, which have
been mentioned bellow[34];
i) Software as a Service
For years now, there has been a constant evolution of complex SaaS but on the
other hand, there is a limited proprietary associated with it. Worst of it is that,
these complex SaaS have fastly grown than their standards. For instance, for three
to four years now , standards such as Service Provisioning Markup Language
(SPML) is still yet to be updated, but the rapid development of SaaS has created
lots of ways of provisioning and managing user profiles. It has even been noticed
that leading cloud service providers in SaaS chooses not to abide and work inline
with the new emerging set of standards. In cases where such has been
utilized,there are still insufficient standards in the ares of provisioning and
management [35].
Also when attending to request made by individual users, SPML providers seem to
lack authoritative third party source and this poses a very big challenge.
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ii) Platform as a Service
PaaS challenges are similar to that of those in SaaS, in terms of Application
Programming Interfaces (API) developments. Currently,the APIs that support
provisioning of PaaS platforms are lacking. Most PaaS providers only offer simple
web forms to create user accounts and profiles [34].
iii) Infrastructure as a Service
In IaaS, it involves provisioning of VPN gateways, hosts, and applications for
individuals and business users. It is a requirement that Organizations should
follow the proprietary mechanisms when dealing with identity management within
the IaaS clouds [34].
3.1.2 Access Control
Providing total access control to data in cloud computing is very challenging and
even more difficult to implement when outsourcing sensitive data outside of the
same trust domain.
Applying cryptographic methods and sharing data encryption keys can help
maintain the confidentiality of sensitive user data against untrusted servers.
However, these solutions comes with lots of workload, and cannot be totally
depended on as the only solution.
Access control services should be made flexible enough when enforcing the
principle of least privilege and it should integrate privacy-protection requirements
by use of complex rules. It's vital to make these rules easy to understand and very
efficient. Also the system must be made in such a way that issues related to
cross-domain access are addressed[35].
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3.1.3 Privacy and Data Protection
Nowadays, it is possible for people to access data related to anyone from any
source or location. Because of this rapid advancement in technology, we are left
with the challenge of “privacy and data protection”. The term privacy, covers the
rights and obligations of individuals and organizations with respect to the
collection, use, retention, disclosure, and disposal of both personal and collective
information. Privacy is considered to be a risk management issue when dealing
with the cloud and because of this particular reason it is essential to protect
identity information, policy components and transaction histories. It's difficult for
organization to trust applications on systems that reside outside of their
on-premise data center when storing their data. This is because private
information faces high risk of potential unauthorized access and exposure. The
only way that users can be sure that their data is protected is by implementing
high security measures. For instance on way of doing this is by encrypting
sensitive data and granting access to only specific users [37][36]
Providing assurance and high degree of transparency is of high importance.
These days, it’s important to know who created a piece of data, modified it and how
it was done. This could be used for different purposes including trace back,
auditing and history-based access control. Now the challenge will lie in balancing
between data provenance and privacy.
3.2 Recommended Security and Privacy Approaches
As a result of the complexity of the current security and privacy issues in the cloud,
researchers have been working and finding ways to come up with possible
solutions to these problems. This section will focus on proposed schemes (possible
solutions) which can be developed and used in order to improve the security
conditions in the cloud.
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3.2.1 Authentication and Identity Management Solution
A strong user authentication framework, in which a legitimate user proves his/her
authenticity before gaining access into the cloud was proposed in a paper: “A
Strong User Authentication Framework for Cloud Computing” [38]. The scheme
uses a two-step verification and it makes use of password, smart-card and out of
band (i.e. strong two-factor) authentication. The purpose of this scheme is to
provides mutual authentication, identity management, session key establishment,
user privacy and security against many popular attacks.
Figure 3.1 Architecture of the proposed scheme [38]
The different steps of authentication as shown in figure 3.1, has been described
bellow[38]:
"Step 1. The user inserts the smart-card in the terminal and enter user ID and
Password (PW). Next, the local system verifies the authenticity of the user based on
smart-card, ID and Password.
Step 2. Once the local verification is over, the user send login request to the cloud
server.
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Step 3. Upon receiving the login request, the cloud server sends some
authentication data based on the specific user.
Step 4. The cloud server sends the onetime key to the mobile network through
HTTP/SMS gateway [42].
Step 5. The mobile network delivers the onetime key to the user via SMS.
Step 6. The user authenticates the server and sends some message based on
smart-card, ID and onetime key.
Step 7. The server authenticates user based on data sent by the user in step 6"[38].
3.2.1.1 Details of Proposed Scheme
For this particular scheme, three assumptions must be taken into consideration
and must not be violated. They are as follows:
1. Assume that clients and service providers are honest during registration.
2. After registration, no client and server is to be trusted. Clients should be verified
during login phase by providing exact identification.
3. Once mutual authentication is attained, the server should always be trusted. It
is also assumed that the server never compromises with the network adversaries.
The notations used in this scheme are mentioned below in table 4.1.
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Table 3.1 Description of notations used
Notation Description
A Represents a user
S Server
ID User Identity
PW User Password
K Onetime Key
x User's Secret Number
y Server's Secret Number
P A Large Prime Number
G Primitive Element in the Galois field GF(p)
h(.) One way hash function, e,g SHA1, SHA2
║ Concatenation Operation
X→Y: M Message M sent, X to Y through Public Channel
X═>Y: M Message M sent, X to Y through Secure Channel
⊕ XOR Operation
The complete proposed scheme has three phases and one activity, i.e. registration
phase, login phase,authentication phase and the activity called password change.
A) Registration phase:
This phase involves registration of users. It is done at the server end, by providing
appropriate identification details. At the end of registration, the user details will
then be processed accordingly by the server. The procedure is as follows [38]:
"1. User A generate a random number x and compute h (PW ⊕ x).
2. A=>S: ID, h (PW⊕ x), h(x)
3. S checks ID (new) =ID (existing). If equal, then reject registration request and
go back to the step 1. Otherwise, proceed to the step 2.
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4. S generates y and compute J=h(ID⊕ h(PW⊕ x)), I= h(ID||y) and
B=
g
h(y)h(x)J)||h(I ++
mod p.
5. S store {I, J, B, p, g, h(.)} in the smart-card.
6. Upon receiving the smart-card, the user enters x into the smart-card. Now smart
card having {I, J, B, p, g, h (.), x}.
7. S stores ID in the ID table maintained in the server"[38].
B) Login Phase:
This phase describes the point where the user wants to login into the clouds. Every
user has to be verified before access is granted to the cloud. The procedure is
described below:
"1. User A insert the smart-card and enter ID and PW.
2. Local system compute J1= h (ID⊕ h (PW⊕ x)), and check if J1=J then proceed
to the next step, otherwise abort.
3. Compute, C=h (I||J) and A→S: M1. User A sends login request message M1,
to the server over the public channel. Here, M1=<B, C> is login request message,.
4. Subsequently, the server generate K, compute B''=g^C+h(y)mod p, h(B''),
L=h(B''||K), and h(L). And the server generate message M2= <h(B''),h(L)>.
5. S→A: M2, S sends M2 to A using public channel. Also, S=>A: K, S sends A,
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onetime key, K using secure OOB channel to user’s mobile phone.
6. Upon receiving message M2, user A computes: B'=Bg^-h(x) mod p and h(B') and
L*=h(B'||K), and h(L*)).
7. User A Check the two conditions, h(B')=h(B'') and h(L*)=h(L), whether true or
not . If both conditions are true, then proceed to the next step, otherwise
terminate the login session.
8. User A compute R=h (T||B'), and generate M3=<I, h(R), T>. A→S: M3. User A
send message M3 to the server over the public channel. Here T is the user's current
time stamp."[38]
C) Authentication Phase:
This is the very last step in which the server decides whether user A should be
permitted to login to the system or not. The authentication phase process is as
follows.
"1. Check if T′ - T≤ ∆T holds true or not. If the condition is false, then the session
should be rejected. Otherwise, proceed to the next step. ∆T is the maximum legal
time difference for an authentication session defined for a networking system and
T′ is the server's current time stamp.
2. Compute I'=h(ID||y) and R*=h(T||B′′).
3. Check whether h(R*)=h(R) and I'=I. If both conditions are true, then proceed
to the next step. Otherwise, terminate the login session.
4. The server generate a session key SK= (R ⊕ L) and compute h(Sk), which is
message M4 <h(Sk)>. S→A: M4 The message M4 is sent to the user over public
channel which contain the hash of a session key, i.e., h (Sk)." [38]
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The login and authentication phase is shown in figure 3.2.
For the final authentication of the user, it required of all valid users to have the
session key SK for some constant definite time. The session key (SK), can be
calculated by the user as SK= (R ⊕ L).
Figure 3.2: Login and authentication phase [38]
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D) Password change:
This is a user friendly facility which gives users the right to change their password
at anytime. It is a very important requirement in authentication schemes. The
procedure for password change is given below.
"1.User A chooses a change of password, in the self system.
2. User A enter ID and PW and compute J*=h (ID⊕ h(PW⊕ x)).
3. Local system checks whether J*=J, if yes, go to the next step, otherwise reject
request.
4. User A enter new password, PW′ and generate x′.
5. Compute, J′= h(ID⊕ h(PW'⊕ x′)).
6. Replace J by J′ and x by x′ in the smart-card." [38]
3.2.1.2 Conclusion
There are two major advantages of this proposed secure cloud architecture. They
are as follows:
1) The scheme has an extra OOB (out of band) factor (other than only two factors)
which undoubtedly provide better security over two factor authentication.
2) It has two separate communication channels, which makes it very difficult for an
adversaries to attack.
Generally, it ensures Authentication and Identity Management by providing
mutual authentication, user privacy, session key agreement and also protecting
the system from so many attacks (like Replay attack, man in the middle attack,
denial of service attack, stolen verifier attack and data modification attack,etc)[38].
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3.2.2 Access Control Approach
A better access control system in cloud computing has been proposed by Wang,
Ren and Lou in the paper "Achieving Secure, Scalable, and Fine-grained Data
Access Control in Cloud Computing". It provides security, scalability and a better
access control mechanism for outsourced data in the cloud. This is done by
combing three different advanced cryptographic techniques: KP-ABE, PRE and
lazy re-encryption [39].
3.2.2.1 Scheme Description
Firstly, it is important to note the notations used (see table 3.2).
Table 3.2 Notations used In Access Control scheme
Notation Description
PK, MK Public Key & Master Key respectively.
T
i
Public Key Component for Attribute i
t
i
Master Key Component for Attribute i
SK Secret Key
ks
i
Secret Key Component for Attribute i
E
i
Ciphertext Component for Attribute i
I Attribute Set assign to Data File
DEK Symmetric Data Encryption Key of Data File
P User Access Structure
L
p
Set of Attributes attached to Leaf Node of P
Att
D
Dummy Attribute
UL System User List
AHLi Attribute History List for Attribute i
rk
ii
'↔ Proxy Re-encryption key from current i to updated version i '
δ
o
, X Data Owner's signature on Message X
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In this scheme, each data file is associated with a set of attributes, and each user is
assigned with an expressive access structure which is defined over these attributes.
It is also possible for different data files to have subset of attributes that are
common. Each attribute is associated with a version number for the purpose of
attribute update. Cloud Servers keep an attribute history list (AHL) which includes
the evolution history of each attribute and PRE keys used. In addition, one dummy
attribute (AttD) is used for key management purpose. This dummy attribute must
be included in every data file's attribute set and never to be updated. The access
control structure uses the tree like implementation in which the interior nodes are
threshold gates and the leaf nodes are associated with data file attributes. The root
node is only needed for the purpose of key management. This root node is
implemented as an AND gate (i.e., n-of-n threshold gate) with one child being
the leaf node and associated with the dummy attribute. The other child node can
have any threshold gate. In addition, a user list (UL) will record all valid user IDs in
the Cloud Servers [39].
The scheme is presented in two levels: System Level and Algorithm Level. The
description of these two are as follows.
1. System Level Operation
The System Level operations entails, system setup, new file creation, new user
grant, user revocation and file deletion. These operation have been described as
follows:
System Setup
Here, the data owner first chooses a security parameter κ and calls the algorithm
level interface ASetup(κ). This will then output the system public parameter PK and
the system master key MK. At this point, the owner will have to sign each compo-
nent of PK and then send this PK along with these signatures to Cloud Servers[39].
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New File Creation
This operation involves the creation of a file and it is processed as follows:
I. The data owner fist selects a unique ID for the data file.
II. Next, a symmetric data encryption key
K
R
DEK ⎯⎯← is randomly selected
where κ is the key space and DEK is used for encrypting the data file.
II. Finally, a set of attribute I for the data file is defined and DEK encrypted with I
using KP-ABE, i.e.
)()( PKDEK,I, }{  I iEE, i
 ~ 
AEncript←∈
In the end, each of these data files is stored on the cloud and in the format shown
in Fig 3.3.
Fig. 3.3 Data File format stored in the Cloud
New User Grant
Adding a new user to the system involves two things; assigning an access structure
and generating a secret key to this user. This is given below as follows:
I. All new users are assigned a unique identity w and an access structure P;
II. A secret key SK is then generated for w, i.e., SK ←AKeyGen(P,MK);
III. Encrypt the tuple (P,SK,PK, δO,(P,SK,PK)) with user w’s public key. The
ciphertext is denoted as C;
IV. The tuple (T,C,δO,(T,C)) is sent to Cloud Servers, where T denotes the tuple
(w, {j, skj }j∈LP \AttD). When this tuple (T,C,δO,(T,C)) is received, the Cloud
Servers will then process it as follows:
V. verify δO,(T,C) and proceed if correct;
- 28 -
VI. Store T in the system user list (UL);
VII. Forward C to the user."[39]
When C is received, it is first decrypted using the user's private key. Next, the
signature δO, (P,SK,PK) has to be verified. If correct, the user will then accept (P,
SK, PK) as his access structure, secret key and the system public key respectively.
Because the secret key components of SK are stored in the cloud servers except for
the dummy attribute AttD, cloud servers can actually be able to update these
secret key components during user revocation. Now, since one undisclosed secret
key component (the one for AttD) still exists, it is impossible for the cloud servers to
use the known ones to correctly decrypt the ciphertexts. Literally, an unauthorized
user cannot decrypt the ciphertext even if he gets to know the disclosed secret key
components.
User Revocation
Before a user is revoked, the owner of the data will first find out the minimal set of
attributes. After which, he will update these attributes. This is done by redefining
their system master key components. The Public key components of these
attributes in PK are redefined accordingly. Next, all user secret keys will be
updated except for the one which is to be revoked. Lastly, in the affected files, the
DEKs are re-encrypted using the recent version of PK.
There is a lot of of computational work to be done in order to undertake this action,
but one way of resolving this is by combining proxy re-encryption with KP-ABE
technique, and then by using Cloud Servers to do data file re-encryption and user
secret key update.
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File Deletion
For this operation to take place, only the data owner has to make the request. If at
all there is need to delete a file, the file’s unique ID is sent along with the data
owner's signature on this ID to Cloud Servers. When this signature has been
proven to be correct, the Cloud Servers can then go further to delete the data file.
2. Algorithm Level Operations
This level has eight algorithms: ASetup, AEncrypt, AKeyGen, ADecrypt,
AUpdateAtt, AUpdateSK, AUpdateAtt4File and AMinimalSet. The first four are
actually the same as Setup, Encryption, Key Generation, and Decryption of the
standard KP-ABE respectively. Much attention is paid on the last four during the
implementation.
AUpdateAtt: this algorithm is responsible for updating attributes to a newer
version. This is done by redefining its system master key and public key
component. With the use of both the old and new attribute versions, the algorithm
can also outputs a proxy re-encryption key. The algorithm used for this operation
is given as:
AUpdateAtt (i,MK)
Randomly pick Z'
p
R
t
i
⎯⎯← ;
Compute
g
t
t
i
i
''← , and
t
i
t
i
i
i
rk
'
' ←↔ ;
Output ti
'
,
T
i
' , and iirk
'
↔ .
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AUpdateAtt4File: Using this algorithm, the ciphertext component of an attribute i
of a file is translated from old to latest version. This is done by first checking the
attribute history list(AHL) and then locating the old version. Next, by using the old
and latest versions, all the PRE keys are multiplied in order to obtain a single PRE
key. This single PRE key is finally applied to the ciphertext component
E
i
and
returns
E
i
n)( . This coincides with the latest definition of attribute i. The
algorithm used for this operation is given as:
AUpdateAtt4File(i,
E
i
,
AHL
i
)
If i has the lates version, exit;
Search
AHL
i
and locate the old version of i ;
// assume the latest definition if i MK is
t
ni )( .
t
t
i
k
r
k
r
kk
r
i
n
i
n
i
i
i
i
r
nii
i
n
)(
'')( )1('
)(.... =↔−↔↔←↔ ;
Compute
g
tk
r
E
n
i
sn
nii
i
E
i
)() )(( =↔← ;
Output E
n
i .
AUpdateSK: This algorithm is responsible for the translation of the secret key
component with attribute i in the user secret key SK from old version to the latest
version. This implementation is similar to AUpdateAtt4File with the exception that,
the last step applies )(
1
)(
−
↔kr
i
n
i to
ks
i
instead of kr i ni )(↔ . This is as a
result of the denominator of the exponent part of
ks
i
while in
E
i
it is a
numerator.
AMinimalSet: This algorithm is responsible for determining a minimal set of
attributes needed for the condition of an access tree to hold. This is done by
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constructing the conjunctive normal form (CNF) of the access tree, and then
returning the attributes in the shortest clause of the CNF formula as the minimal
attribute set.
3.2.2.2 Conclusion of proposed scheme
If applied correctly, the scheme can address the following :
I)Fine-grained Access Control; it is possible to get a well defined and expressive,
and flexible access structure.
II)User Access Privilege confidentiality; only the leaf node information of a user's
access tree is disclosed to cloud servers, which makes it hard for cloud servers to
recover the access structure. And thus user access privilege confidentiality is
ensured.
III)User Secret Key Accountability; By using the enhanced construction of
KP-ABE , this property can be achieved[56]. This can then be used to disclose the
identities of key abusers.
IV)Data confidentiality; This scheme is secured enough to protect the system even
if there is collusion attacks between Cloud Servers and malicious users.
3.2.3 Privacy and Data Protection solution
In 2009, the International Business Machine Corporation (IBM) proposed a
solution on privacy and data protection, in which they developed a fully
homomorphic encryption scheme. This scheme allows data to be processed
without being decrypted [40].
Notwithstanding that, a Cloud Data Protection System (CDPS) has also been
proposed in another paper[42]. This scheme is described in the following sections.
3.2.3.1 Architecture of the Scheme
Figure 3.4 shows the architecture of Cloud Data Protection System (CDPS) in
which the upper part determines a composition of encryption algorithm and
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division numbers which is used to protect users’ data. The lower half protect the
flow of data by means of selective security composition and Data Division
mechanisms.
Fig 3.4 Cloud data protection system architecture [42]
Furthermore, the diagram describes the privacy requirement and frequency of the
key used to encrypt data. The quantification model is used to achieve both the
security and algorithm execution speed. Basically, when executing encryption
algorithm, a measure of the cracking year of each encryption algorithm used by
CDPS is taken into account. Also the speed quantification mechanism will
measure the mega clock cycles per megabyte when executing each encryption
algorithm in specific machine [42]. This scheme adds more security to the data by
using data division techniques as shown in the CDPS architecture.
3.2.3.2 Privacy Requirement and Analysis
The sensitivity of data varies from one to the other and this is largely based on the
degree of importance. By using encryption algorithm and data division, it is
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actually possible to obtain data confidentiality [42].
Addressing the privacy requirements of user’s data is also essential. This leads us
to the different entities responsible for the provision of privacy protection. These
entities has been described as follows:
1) Privacy Level
There are basically three privacy levels mentioned below and these are to be
selected based on the requirement by each user. These different levels can be
selected in line with the degree of security based on the data sensitivity. These have
been divided into three levels, speed, hybrid, and security [42].
In the Speed level, the requirement is that there should be no sensitive information
in the data. In order words this level deals with less sensitive data. A very weak
encryption is applied in this case. In the case of the Hybrid level, some amount of
sensitivity must be present in order for this level to be selected by a user. Meaning
weak encryption mechanism must not be applied here. Now for the last
level(Security level)to be applied, there must be high amount of sensitivity in the
data. This is used only when effective protection of data is needed. In this
particular case,users have to focus more on obtaining confidentiality instead of
performance.
2) Key Update Frequency
After a specific privacy level have been selected, the range of security required is
calculated as:
||||
max
P
level
range
Security
Security
= ………………….................................(eq. 1)
The maximum security which is the numerator part, is the security score obtained
by the CDPS when the most strong encryption algorithm is used. This value is 100.
Also, the denominator value obtained is refereed to as the privacy levels.
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Another important factor which should be looked at is that of the key update
frequency. This parameter tends to affect the performance overheads when data is
frequently written in the cloud. This is only solved by revising the encryption
algorithm based on the obtained key update frequency. In order to solve this
problem, the encryption algorithm is revised according to the key update frequency
since the more the encryption key is updated, the shorter the average key life cycle
becomes. The frequency of the key update is thus calculated using equation 2[42].
∆
=
t
Period
data
A
Write
Frequency
KeyUpdate
…………………............................(eq. 2)
Writing the data frequently, will obviously reduce the life cycle of key.Thus, it is
better to select the high performance security algorithm in order to provide better
I/O performance.
Quantification Models
This model constitute two types; the Security Quantification and that of Speed
Quantification. The security strength of any encryption algorithm is measured
using the time taken for it to be cracked. This is normalized to map the security
strength into a range between 0 and 100. Speed Quantification deals with the time
taken for an encryption algorithm to be performed. In this case, the CPU
consumption rate can be used to determine the encryption time.
Data Division
This is the case where a particular data is split into different segments and then
stored in different location so as to improve the speed taken to execute them. This
is applied after encryption operation has been done on the data.
Mathematically, it can be found that the probability of hacking all divided parts
becomes smaller as the number of divided parts increases[42]. As a result, it
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makes it very difficult for the attacker to obtain all of the divided encrypted parts.
Hence applying this method in any cloud environment can effectively enhance data
security.
3.2.3.3 Conclusion
Base on simulation work done, it shows that this scheme can effectively achieve
data privacy in cloud environment. It provides confidentiality of users’ data without
further increase in system performance overhead. Hence when compared to other
security schemes,the improved performances is up to 50% and at least 35%[42].
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CHAPTER FOUR
Identity and Access management
This chapter looks at identity and access management(IAM) implementation in
OpenStack Object Storage (swift). Upon conducting a security investigation,
different issues related to IAM in swift were found out.
The following sections in this chapter provides description of IAM in Openstack
Object storage and the issues associated with it.
4.1 User Identity Provisioning/De-provisioning
4.1.1 Overview
The process of creating users, registering users, and managing access to resources
in a system is know as user provisioning. The opposite operation is called
de-provisioning. It is very important to automate user management tasks. In
OpenStack, the authentication/authorization system is pluggable and thus, it
does not depend on the project itself. Figure 4.1 describes how the swift
authentication mechanism is done. Firstly, the client submit his user credentials
to the public authentication system. When these credentials have been verified, he
will then send a token request to the proxy server. The proxy server further ask the
the private authentication for a token. A token will then be generated and sent to
the client. The received token is what the client uses before it can be granted access
to the storage nodes that he has permissions to.
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Fig 4.1 Swift authentication (pluggable) [44]
OpenStack Object Storage uses both DevAuth and SwAuth as its
authentication/authorization systems [45].The main difference between the two
lies in how the data is stored. DevAuth uses SQLite database as a user data storage,
while SQLite stores data in a single cross-platform file on disk [46]. One significant
issue with SQLite is that it allows multiple reads but allows only a single write
operation to be done to a file. This means using DevAuth in a system which will
require simultaneous registration of many users can definitely cause performance
slowdown. Though this problem exist, OpenStack Object Storage still uses
DevAuth as its default authentication system. SwAuth seems to be a more
"scalable authentication and authorization system when compared to DevAuth,
and it uses Swift itself as its backing store" [47]. Swift account is created on a
cluster in which the information from users are stored as JSON -encoded data text
files.
User roles are based on OpenStack Object Storage and its source code. The
following types of user roles exist:
I) Users: These are considered to be the ordinary users of the service and they are
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not granted any administrative rights.
II) Admin: these set of people have administrative rights but they can only add
users to accounts which they have rights to administrate. In SwAuth, users can be
barned from administering accounts.
III) Reseller Admin: For these set of users, they have Administrative permissions
on all of the accounts but they are not allowed to add other Reseller Admins
IV) Super Admin: These are the most powerful users/administrators. They can
perform all user management tasks, to the extent of even adding Reseller Admins.
4.1.2 Elevation of Privileges in OpenStack Object Storage
When adding or removing users from a system, a possible arising issue is elevation
of privileges. OpenStack object storage user management is role based, and also
the access permissions are specified directly in the code. When ever someone tries
to add another user into the system, the code will check to see if the user executing
a given action is acting in a role of Super Admin or not. It is feasibly impossible to
delegate the permission of adding a Reseller Admin, except if a Super Admin power
is assign to the user which is to be added.
Devauth
User information are stored by Devauth in SQLite database and these files are
located in etc/-swift/auth.db. In the case where a user is acting in a role of Super
Admin, his password will be checked from the configuration file of the Swift
authentication service. Otherwise, the user data will be retrieved from the database.
It has been found that the code that connects to database might be susceptible to
SQL injection. As a result of this, the source code used during installation was
examined to see whether such attacks are really possible. By using the python
code below, it can be verified whether users have administrative privileges or not
[48]:
1 row=conn.execute( ' ' '
2 SELECT reseller_admin , admin FROM account
- 39 -
3 WHERE account = ? AND user = ? AND password = ? ' ' ' ,
4 (account, user, request.headers.get( ' X-Auth-Admin-Key ' ) ) )
5 .fetchone ()
The user data is passed to the SQL code without filtering the inputs (see
request.headers.get(’X-Auth--Admin-Key’)) and this makes one to think that the
code is vulnerable. However, after thorough checking, it was found that actually
there are no vulnerabilities in the sqlite3 library itself [50] and at the same time,
there are no possibilities to elevate privileges using SQL injection attacks.
Swauth
The figure 4.2, shows how User information are stored by Swauth as
JSON-encoded data. The user groups are stored in an array of objects with single
attribute name in which the attribute's value represents the name of user groups .
In the case where the user is a Reseller Admin, he will belong to the group
reseller_admin but if he is an Admin, then he will belong to the group admin (the
user in Figure 4.2 has Administrative privileges). Super Admin information is
stored in the configuration file of OpenStack Object Storage just as in devauth.
Fig 4.2 Swauth authentication system password file contents[48]
In order to examine wether it is possible to inject .reseller_admin or .admin values
into the groups array, the following Python codes was used to create
JSON-encoded string with user data[48]:
1 groups =[ ' %s : % ' (account , user) , account ]
2 if admin:
3 groups . append( '.admin' )
4 if reseller_admin:
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5 groups . Append( ' , reseller_admin ' )
6 json . dumps ( { ' auth ' : ' plaintext :%s ' % key , ' groups ' : [ { ' name ' : g}
for g in groups ] } )
The protection against injections is found in json.dumps method. This method
accepts an object and converts its properties to a string, performing proper
escaping of input, which is why we could not find a way to affect the value of one
property by injecting input via another property (for example, we can not affect
group information by injecting data to key input). If a JSON data was created using
simple string concatenation, then injection attacks would be feasible.
To conclude this section, it was found that there are no vulnerabilities in devauth
and swauth systems that lead to the elevation of privileges during identity
provisioning.
4.2 Identity Federation
The process of exchanging identity information between identity providers and that
of service providers is termed as identity federation[51]. SAML or WS-Federation
are mostly recommended as enabling technologies in Cloud computing [52].
OpenStack Object Storage does not support identity federation. But using the
PySAML2 codes[53], it is feasible to incorporate PySAML2 into OpenStack in order
to add Identity Federation functionality to the software, Since authentication
system in OpenStack Object Storage is written as WSGI middleware itself [54].
4.3 Authentication In OpenStack Object Storage
4.3.1 Overview
Both DevAuth and SwAuth authentication systems use username and password
during authentication. When a user has been successfully authenticated into the
system, a token will be sent to him, which he will further use to identify himself .
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Normally, the received token will last for a period of 24 hours (which in fact is the
default expiration time). Also, an account URL is created upon account registration
and not supposed to be ever changed [55].
Almost all documents related to cloud security make it clear on the need to allow
authentication delegation by accepting confirmations in SAML format.
Notwithstanding that, this SAML feature has still not yet been implemented in
OpenStack.
4.3. 2 Password Strength
It is important to take a close study on the password strength requirement since
both DevAuth and SwAuth in OpenStack Object Storage uses username and
password combination to authenticate users. There is currently a guideline which
provides rules as to how users should choice their passwords. This includes
checking passwords in order to avoid possible dictionary attack, making emphases
on minimal password length, and also applying a combination of different
characters (lower-case, upper-case, non-alphabetic) [56]. Unfortunately no such
requirements (password length and special characters) exist in OpenStack. Also
there is no dictionary checks, this makes it possible for users to register with
password as short as one character even.
4.3.3 Password storage
Storing passwords in a very secured way has been an issue throughout the history
of information systems. In general, the golden rule in Information Security is "don't
store passwords in clear-text", and this must be ensured by the administrator. It is
better to use encryption methods and also very important to provide a limited
access to locations of stored passwords. In order words only administrators with
special access rights should be able to locate these passwords.
DevAuth stores username and password in a configuration file, located at
etc/swift/auth.db. Interestingly, it can be noticed that passwords are stored in
plain text format. An instance of stored username and password in DevAuth is
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shown below:
Jdcooper@openstack:~/swift$ locate proxy-server.conf
/etc/swift/proxy-server.conf
/home/jdcooper/swift/doc/proxy-server.conf.4
/home/jdcooper/swift/etc/proxy-server.conf-sample
jdcooper@openstack:~?swift$ cat/etc/swift/proxy-server.conf |grep admin
operator_roles = admin
admin_token = ADMIN
#user_admin_admin = admin.admin.reseller_admin
#user_test_tester = testing. admin
#user_test2_tester = testing2.admin
jdcooper@openstack:~/swift$
Another problem also is that, the default settings in DevAuth actually give users
the right to read from this file. This makes it possible for system users to easily
obtain password and gain access to accounts of other users. Hence the reason why
DevAuth is not usually considered for developing purposes. This weakness should
be well noted and documented in order to warn users about it consequences .
Initially during the setup, the access rights should be changed such that only
system administrators must have read permissions to such sensitive file.
On the other hand, Super User’s password is stored in /etc/swift/auth-server. conf
for DevAuth and /etc/swift/proxy-server.conf for SwAuth. This is also done in
different manner compared to how other user's passwords are stored. Only that
the password in this configuration file is also stored in clear text. Which brings us
back to the need of changing passwords after OpenStack installation and making
sure that access rights are reviewed, such that only legitimate owners of file(s)
should have read/write permissions.
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Unlike DevAuth, SwAuth possesses properly configured access rights in securing
password data. The only security concerns with swAuth is that passwords are also
stored in clear text in the file as shown in figure 4.2 . As a result, this can lead to an
insider attack, in the case where a system administrator uses UNIX superuser
(root) account to find out user passwords.
In a simple conclusion, both DevAuth and SwAuth lack appropriate protection
scheme for storing passwords.
4.3.4 Analysis of Authentication Tokens
Tokens are received when a user authenticate successfully into a system. And they
are used inline with a service request, in which username and password are given
as an input to the interface. Tokens can become invalid in two cases:
I) When they run out of time. In order words, they become expired.
II) If revoked.
It is important to note that authentication should be performed over a secure
channel (TLS), otherwise, there are chances that an attacker could retrieve a user
token, and use it to perform attacks ( like "man in the middle" attack), and ends up
impersonating the actual user who received the token from the authentication
system.
However, in an experiment conducted by Rostyslav Slipetskyy [48], the algorithms
from token generation were first imported and examine using webscarab and later
exported to Burp Sequencer in order to run randomness test on the token data.
This is shown in figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Analysis of authentication tokens from openStack using burp
Sequencer[ 48]
According to the results obtained from the tool, the overall quality of randomness
within the sample is estimated to be excellent and it was summed up that the
approach taken to generate UUID uses a solid source of randomness which has no
known weaknesses. With such result, one can conclude that the system is pretty
much secured[48].
4.4 Authorization and Access Control
4.4.1 Overview
This section looks at the authorization procedures with regards to accounts,
containers and objects. In OpenStack Object Storage, accounts are created both
for single group usage. Objects in OpenStack Object Storage looks like files in
traditional operating systems, and containers resemble folders (or directories).
The different actions which can be undertaken by different types of users with
accounts are:
User: these kind of people have account management rights.
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Admin: these types are permitted to obtain only account information (URL, users,
etc.).
Reseller Admin: they have rights that can enable them to add and remove
accounts. They also have Administrative permissions to get information about an
account.
Super Admin : they have the same permissions just as Reseller Admin.
And the actions that users in different roles can perform with containers are:
User: For this type, they can only access containers which they have permissions
to based on the access control list(ACL).
Admin: This type of users are permitted to undertake all operations within there
own account (add/remove containers, upload/download objects, etc.)
Reseller Admin: For this type, they have permissions to all accounts
Super Admin: These users have no permissions to undertake container/object
management. Figure 4.4 shows the dashboard view of the admin(access control
and security) section of OpenStack.
In the authorization system, it is not possible to make permissions at the object
level,but rather at the container level. Users are granted access right only by the
administrator and it depends on the access control lists (ACL).
Specific separate ACLs for read and write operations can be made. Each item in
ACL can either grant or deny access based on any of the following parameters:
Referrer designation based on HTTP Referrer header.
All users of a specific account.
Specific user of a specific account.
Security documents recommend the use of eXtensible Access Control Markup
Language (XACML) to control access to cloud resources [58], but unfortunately,
OpenStack Object Storage does not use any of them since it relies on a proprietary
solution.
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Figure 4.4 OpenStack admin section prototype for Access Control & Security
4.4.2 Too Much Access Rights for Reseller Admins
Reseller Admins have permissions to all accounts. They can do anything within
any account as long as they possess the URL to that account. The documentation
of OpenStack Object Storage does not mention in detail the actual permission of
Reseller Admins. Only Admins and Users Permissions are mention in it [40].
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In order to check wether this was true, an investigation was conducted on the
system as follows:
Firstly, a user is added in the place of a Reseller Admin with name saramba to
accounta. Secondly, container filesb is created on accountb and then files are
uploaded to it. Afterwards, an attack was performed by using authentication
service to obtain token and account URL for Reseller Admin as shown below:
The HTTP response above, reveals that the authentication service is saying that the
user saramba should use the URL from X-Storage-Url header to get access to the
account.
Using the received authentication token (X-Auth-Token), but changing the storage
URL to the one pointing to accountb, can literally allow a Reseller Admin to
successfully receive statistics of accountb and the name of containers within this
account (filesb):
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The files names from this container was obtain using the container name. Because
these file names can be known, it is possible for anyone to issue HTTP requests in
order to download these files or even delete them. Hence this confirms that any
user with Reseller Admin role and with knowledge of the URL to this account has
permissions to perform any action with the objects within any account.
This severely violates privacy of users who store their files on OpenStack Object
Storage. Wether files are encrypted or not, it is not correct for Reseller Admins to
have permissions to view other account details.
4.4.3 Elevation of Privileges Protection
In OpenStack Object Storage system, account management is similar to that of
user management, and the protection against illegal elevation of privileges is
literally the same for the two, since access control to objects is done based on
access rights to a container where an object is stored. Access rights to containers
are stored in ACLs. ACL itself is stored in a container database that is created for
each of the existing containers. The source code that manipulates ACLs
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(common/db.py) was checked and found that there is no possibility for injections
[48].
4.5 Recommendations for IAM Issues in OpenStack Swift
The following recommendations can be used to mitigate the issues that have been
found in the Identity and Access Management in OpenStack Object Storage. The
following provides recommendations for the issues experienced by both users and
developers of OpenStack:
Firstly, the file(etc/swift/auth.db) in DevAuth which stores user information must
be examine in order to make a change to the access right. Only the swift user
actually needs read right to this file. This mitigates the risk of obtaining user
informations(like passwords) by other users.
Secondly, during installation of the OpenStack swift the default super user's
password must be changed. The access right to the file having this information
must be set such that only the owner should have read/write permission and
users should take note of the excess rights given to Reseller Admins in viewing
other account details. Also though ACL manipulation seems to be impossible, it is
still recommended that users use HTTPS instead the HTTP Referrer field when
making authorization decisions, since the HTTP field can easily be forge.
Thirdly, developers should implement user provisioning functionality using Service
Provisioning Markup Language (SPML) and for that of authentication functionality,
they should use Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) to allow identity
federation and avoid locking into proprietary solutions. The PySAML2 Python
library can be used by the developers.
Lastly, Having a system which can check for the strength of password before
registering users, can help eliminate weak passwords (python-crack Library can be
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very useful) and these passwords should be hashed before stored in either
DevAuth or SwAuth authentication system. It is even wiser for passwords to be
concatenated to a salt and/or username and then hashing them with an
appropriate algorithm, before storing [56]. Preferably, the SHA-256 algorithm can
be used to hash them. And in the case where a salt value is used (not username), it
can be stored alongside hashed password [48].
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CHAPTER FIVE
Data Management In OpenStack Object Storage
This chapter analyses data management in OpenStack Object Storage. It looks at
the legal issues of data location compliance, data isolation,backup, recovery and
deletion, encryption and key management and data integrity.
The issues have been analyzed and recommendations provided as well.
5.1 Locating Data In OpenStack
Locating user's data in OpenStack Object Storage is done via HTTP calls to a Proxy
server. The logical path to an account, container, or object is known using obtained
storage URL from the authentication server. This path normally ends with the
account name for which the user is registered. For instance,the code below show
logical path to the user object myObject, which is stored in container myContainer:
https://<PROXY─IP>:8080/v1/AUTH_e5825ba750324be4abf5c4faa6cdc524
/myContainer/myObject
Having the storage account, the proxy server is then used to translate the logical
path to a physical location where the data actually reside in the cluster. The proxy
server uses the concept of rings to determine the physical data location in the
cluster[59]. This cluster is divided into partitions, and each of these partition is
then mapped to a device (a hard disk on one of the nodes in the cluster). The ring
structure is used to determine on which nodes the partition has to be replicated.
When the proxy server finally finds the physical location, it will then contact a
dedicated server process on a Storage node. The data is then sent from Proxy
server to a corresponding service entity.
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5.2 OpenStack Isolation and Possible Attacks
5.2.1 How Isolation is Done In OpenStack Object Storage
One of the main features of cloud computing is sharing resources among different
users (customers). When it comes to OpenStack Object storage, its all about
storage sharing. The issue of data isolation is irrelevant when dealing with private
cloud deployment, since utilization of the cloud storage is done only by a single
organization. However, for public deployment, this issue is of high importance.
The separation of data that belong to different users (customers) has been given
enough attention in most security documents. Data isolation can be referred to as
words isolation, or compartmentalization. But the main idea here, is that of "data
separation".
The directory structure for OpenStack Object Storage entities is shown in figure
5.1. From figure 5.1, accounts, containers, and objects have different directory on
the storage device. All information about accounts and containers are stored in
SQLite database files, while those about objects are stored as files with extension
".data". The temporary directory is used for storing file chunks during upload.
There are partitions within each of the directories of OpenStack entities and these
partitions are referred to as a directory whose name equals to a number between 1
and 2 max >−−< numberpartition [48]. The Max-partition-number is selected when
creating the ring structure. Since the partition number is determined by bit shift
arithmetic, it is possible that files belonging to different users from different
accounts will be stored within the same partition directory.
Fig. 5.1OpenStack Object Storage directory structure
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5.2.2 Attacks on OpenStack Isolation
OpenStack relies only on path hashing to isolate files belonging to different
users[48]. In order to investigate this further whether OpenStack approach to
isolation can be abused, let's assume that there is an attacker within the system.
Two possible attacks can be considered: the preimage attack and that of collision
attack.
In the Preimage Attack, attacker needs to have knowledge of the path to a file and
then find the names for a container and object that will hash to the same value as
that of the user’s file of known path. But as at now, there are no such algorithm to
find an input which will match the desired output of a hash function. It's hard to
conclude that the said algorithm is unknown to any intelligence agencies or that it
will not be found in the nearest future. However, there are no reasons to state that
this approach taken by OpenStack is flawed.
The Collision Attack involves the case where an attacker tries to generate names of
files, which will eventually result in the same hash value and then changing the
"container/object" suffix. This attack can possibly be performed on MD5 [60].
Fortunately enough, this attack can actually be prevented by OpenStack. It is done
by adding the hash_path_suffix, to a file path before passing the input to a hash
function[61].
However, it is important to note that the best measure to take if one must avoid
such attack is by keeping the hash_path_suffix value as secret [64]. Besides, other
hashing functions than MD5 can also be considered [63].
5.3 Backup and Recovery
Data backup is the process of making a complete secondary copy of a data. The
objective of this mechanism is to prevent "data loss, unwanted data overwrite, and
destruction" [65]. By doing backup operations, data can be easily recovered if there
is any kind of disaster in the system.
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OpenStack Object Storage prevents data loss and provides availability by use of
replication mechanism. That is, storing data in several location across a cluster. A
dedicated server process called replicator is responsible to propagate data copies to
different nodes within the Object Storage system. And of course there are separate
processes responsible for the replication of accounts, containers, and objects.
Literally, OpenStack does not support data backup/recovery and this is a big
problem. When a new object is uploaded with a name equal to an existing one, all
the previous versions of this file will be deleted. Though replication prevents data
loss, in the case of unwanted data overwrite, it is impossible to restore file to a
previous version [66] [67].
Backup/recovery operation can possibly be added to OpenStack without much
changes in the source code. After a file has been successfully uploaded via PUT
method, the stored file will then receive a name equal to timestamp, and all the
previous versions of the file will be deleted.
5.4 Data Deletion
Data deletion basically deals with the removal of all copies of the data that exists in
a cluster. One should take note of the fact that it's possible for the data to be
deleted in all, but one storage node becomes restored afterwards due to recovery
procedure. Also a major issue with deleting data is dealing with proper storage
recycling since files (or some parts of it) that were deleted can be recovered from the
hard disk later.
In OpenStack Object Storage, the files are first written to a temporary location on a
storage device, which by default is set to /srv/node/sdb1/tmp. The temporary
directory is common for all the users (customers) on the system.
Afterwards, when all the file chunks are uploaded, this file is then moved to a new
location by using the Python os.rename function. Also the new location for the file
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is determined by the hashing approach that was described earlier in section 5.1.
The new file will take a name equal to the timestamp specified in the HTTP header
X-Timestamp.
When a user wants to delete a file, OpenStack will then creates a new zero-size file
with extension *.ts (tombstone) and new timestamp as a name. Afterwards, the
algorithm which is used to delete files with older time-stamps is run. With the help
of the tombstone file, OpenStack can safely resolve the problem of removing file
from all the nodes: the tombstone file can later be propagated to other nodes using
the replication process, and at the same time the actual content of the file is been
deleted.
5.5 Encryption and Key Management
In OpenStack Object Storage, files are not encrypted before they are stored in a
cluster [68]. In order words, users having sensitive information should first encrypt
their files before storing them in OpenStack swift system and also manage their
encryption keys themselves.
One reason for users to encrypt their files before storing in OpenStack is that,
users in role of Reseller Admin can view any file on any of the accounts, as noted in
section 4.4.2.
5.6 Data Integrity
In OpenStack, it's a possible to perform integrity verification on the server side.
This is done by providing the MD5 hash of the uploaded object in ETag HTTP
header [69]. OpenStack will then calculate the MD5 hash on the server and
compare the two values. If the user-supplied value and calculated value are not the
same, an HTTP response code 422 is returned. According to the RFC 4918, it
literally means that the "server understands the content type of the request entity,
and the syntax of the request entity is correct, but was unable to process the
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contained instructions" [70].
OpenStack Object Storage provides the following possibilities for integrity checks:
1. End-to-end data integrity checks during the transfer, done on the server side.
2. End-to-end data integrity checks during the transfer, done on the client side.
3. Continuous integrity monitoring of objects stored in the cluster.
In the case of the client-side, users do the integrity checks by using the ETag value
from the HTTP response. However, in case of integrity errors, the erroneous version
of a file will be stored and replicated across OpenStack cluster. As a way of
preventing others from downloading incorrect data, users will have to upload the
same file again. Hence the need to perform server-side integrity checks during
upload.
When analyzing the source code on the Storage server, a daemon process is
responsible for making integrity checks and is called auditor. The accounts,
containers, and objects all have their separate auditors. The account and container
auditors are limited to checking the possibility of reading data from the database.
While that of the Object auditor is responsible for checking file size and hash value
by comparing the actual size and MD5 hash value to that which is stored in the
object meta-data. Object meta-data is known to be stored as extended attributes
on a file-system, and this is the reason why only those file-systems that support
the said attributes can be used. If the server process discovers that the actual hash
value of an object different from that stored in meta-data, a file will be quarantined
and a correct version of it will be reloaded correctly from another replica in a
cluster.
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5.7 Recommendations for Data Management
This chapter has been concluded with the following recommendations:
It must be ensured that the file /etc/swift/swift.conf is protected from modifications.
If the hash_path_suffix value is modified, previously uploaded files to OpenStack
Object Storage will become inaccessible. It is necessary to encrypt all important
and sensitive files before uploading them to OpenStack, in order to stop users
(those acting in a role of Reseller Admin) from viewing files which belong to other
users.
Data location compliance can be assured by either making modification to ring
structure, or building a wrapper over the Ring class that reuses get_more_nodes
method since this will allow restriction of data location to only specific zones.
Finally, it is recommended to make a number of kept backup copies configurable,
and to change unlinkold method in DiskFile class to delete only those previous
versions of files that exceed the configured value. This will allow backup and
recovery operations to take place in OpenStack Object Storage.
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CHATER SIX
Summary of Contributions and Future Work
6.1 Contributions
This thesis contributes towards improving the security related issues which are
present in cloud computing in general and also to those within the Open-Stack
Object Storage. It attempts in showing that there is still more to be done in
implementing proper security and privacy mechanisms the cloud.
The research work looks at possible security flaws found in OpenStack Object
Storage(swift). Different documents which are geared towards facilitation of the
adoption of cloud computing were examined and the most important security
issues were considered. These issues were recorded in chapter three.
Also, by installing the OpenStack cloud, several security weaknesses were found in
the areas of Identity and Access Management, and that of Data Management.
These two major areas were covered in chapter four and five respectively.
From the investigation done using the installed OpenStack Object Storage, it was
found that there are possibilities for administrators with lower permissions to
obtain credentials of other administrators with higher permissions. Another
instance of security weakness, is the possibility of a particular administrators to be
granted with too much access rights. This subsequently gives the said
administrator the permission to read/delete any file belonging to any user. Also,
issues of poor password management procedures for both authentication systems
(SwAuth and DevAuth) was a found.
With further investigations of how data is managed in OpenStack, it was found
that there is possibility for isolated files to be compromised. This could possibly
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lead to legal claims from dishonest customers(users). Another major problem with
most cloud providers is that they don't afford to encrypt user's data. OpenStack is
not an exception to this problem.
Nevertheless, some security measures can be implement in order to mitigate these
weaknesses. First and foremost, it is essential to have a system which can check
the strength of user's password during registration. The file in DevAuth which
stores user information must be properly examined in order to make change to the
access rights. Only the swift user actually needs read right to this file. This will
prevent unauthorized people from obtaining user informations.
For user provisioning functionality, developers should use Service Provisioning
Markup Language (SPML) and for that of authentication functionality, Security
Assertion Markup Language (SAML) can be recommended. The PySAML2 Python
library can be used. Lastly, users must ensure to encrypt all sensitive data/files
before storing them in cloud. More details of the findings and recommendations
can be found in chapter three and four of this thesis.
Conclusion
Both the theoretical and practical findings have clearly shown that there is great
need to improve the security and privacy situation in cloud computing . Since
cloud computing is relatively new, it is necessary to undertake more studies of
security issues in cloud computing. This will improve the current security status of
the cloud and as a result more people will find it necessary to adopt and become
users of cloud services,thereby creating a steady economic growth for both the
service providers and users.
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6.2 Future Work
Cloud computing is still a new innovative approach on IT usage and there are
many issues still to be considered for its improvement. It has many security
concerns which involve both technical (for instance, reliability, security and
privacy etc) and non-technical (for instance, legal and economic) issues. Therefore,
more research work should be done in the direction of Security.
Consideration of other OpenStack Project: This research considers only the
OpenStack Object Storage (swift) which is just one of the three projects. In the
future, the OpenStack Compute and OpenStack Image Service should also be
investigate for security issues.
Provide better data encryption methods: more research should be done in order
to develop better data encryption methods. And, cloud service providers must
endeavour to implement these data encryption methods, for proper protection of
user(customer) data.
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Glossary
Collision Attack
An attack on hash function that aims to find
two messages that have same hash values.
Hypervisor
See Virtual Machine Monitor
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)
Cloud service delivery model under which
customer can use provider’s computing
resources to deploy and run arbitrary
software which can include operating
systems and applications
Platform as a Service (PaaS)
Cloud service delivery model under which
customer can use provider’s development
environment to create applications and
deploy them on provider’s cloud
Infrastructure.
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Preimage Attack
An attack on hash function that aims to find
a message that has a specific hash value.
Private Cloud
Cloud deployment model under which cloud
infrastructure is utilized by a single
organization.
Public Cloud
Cloud deployment model under which cloud
infrastructure is made available to the
general public.
Software as a Service (SaaS)
Cloud service delivery model under which
customer can use provider’s applications
running on a cloud infrastructure.
User De-provisioning
A process of un-registering users from a
system.
User Provisioning
A process of registering new users in a
system.
Virtual Machine Monitor
A layer of software between an operating
system and hardware that is used to operate
virtual machines
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Appendix A
Suggestion for Implementing Backup/Recovery in OpenStack
The information below is only an extract from the mailing list discussion analyzing
backup and recovery in OpenStack.
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Appendix B
Configuration Files Used for the Deployment of OpenStack
Object Storage
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